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Abstract—Space-time causality is one of the fundamental
notions of modern physics; however, it is difficult to define in
observational physical terms. Intuitively, the fact that a spacetime event e = (t, x) can causally influence an event e′ = (t′ , x′ )
means that what we do in the vicinity of e changes what we
observe at e′ . If we had two copies of the Universe, we could
perform some action at e in one copy but not in another copy; if
we then observe the difference at e′ , this would be an indication
of causality. However, we only observe one Universe, in which we
either perform the action or we do not. At first glance, it may
seem that in this case, there is no meaningful way to provide an
operational definition of causality. In this paper, we show that
such a definition is possible if we use the notions of algorithmic
randomness and Kolmogorov complexity. The resulting definition
leads to a somewhat unexpected consequence: that space-time
causality is a matter of degree.

I. D EFINING C AUSALITY I S I MPORTANT
Space-time causality is important. Causal relation between
space-time events (i.e., points in space-time) is one of the
fundamental notions of physics; see, e.g., [1], [3]). Because
of this, many fundamental physical theories describe, among
other things, the causal relation between space-time events.
According to modern physics, space-time causal relation
is non-trivial. In Newton’s physics, it was assumed that influences can propagate with an arbitrary speed, constituting, in
effect, immediate action-at-a-distance. Under this assumption,
an event e = (t, x) occurring at moment t at location x can
influence an event e′ = (t′ , x′ ) occurring at moment t′ at
location x′ if and only if the second event occurs later than
the first one, i.e., if and only if t < t′ .
In special relativity, the speeds of all the processes are
limited by the speed of light c. In this theory, an event
e = (t, x) can influence an event e′ = (t′ , x′ ) if during the
time t′ − t, the faster possible process – light – can cover the
distance d(x, x′ ) between locations x and x′ , i.e., if
c · (t′ − t) ≥ d(x, x′ ).

In the general relativity theory, the space-time is curved, so
the corresponding causal relation is even more complex. This
relation is also complex in alternative gravitation theories; see,
e.g., [3].
Need for experimental verification of space-time casuality. Different theories, in general, make different predictions
about the causality. So, to experimentally verify fundamental
physical theories, we need to be able to experimentally verify
the corresponding space-time causality. In other words, we
must be able to experimentally check, for every two spacetime events a and b, whether the event a can causally influence
the event b.
Need for a theory-free verification of space-time causality.
Since the space-time causality is fundamental, more fundamental than specific partial differential equations that describe
the physical fields and/or their relation with space-time, it is
desirable to be able to experimentally check this causality in a
theory-free way, without invoking other fields and corresponding differential equations.
In this paper, we describe a possible way of such theory-free
experimental validation of space-time causality.
Comment. Some of the ideas described in this paper first
appeared in [4].
II. D EFINING C AUSALITY: C HALLENGE
Intuitive meaning of space-time casuality. Intuitively, the
fact that a space-time event e can causally influence an event
e′ means that:
• what we do in the vicinity of e
′
• changes what we observe at e .
How to transform this meaning into a definition: a hypothetical idea. The above intuitive meaning of space-time
causality can easily lead to a observational definition if we had
two (or more) copies of the Universe. In this case, to check

that e can causally influence e′ , we could do the following
(see, e.g., [5]):
• in one copy of the Universe, we perform some action at
e, and
• we do not perform this action in the second copy of the
Universe.
If the resulting states at e′ are different in the two copies of
the Universe, this would be an indication of causal relation
between e and e′ .
Comment. This interpretation of causality is known as a
counterfactual interpretation; see, e.g., [6]. This name comes
from the usual interpretation of counterfactual statements,
i.e., statements of the type “If we were born in Sahara,
we would have been better adjusted for the warm climate.”
These statements are called counterfactual because the premise
(we are born in Sahara) contradicts to the facts. The usual
interpretation of such statements is to consider not just our
world, but also the whole set of possible worlds. To check
whether a counterfactual statement is true we select, among
all possible worlds in which the premise is satisfied, the one
which is the closest to our own world. The statement is
considered true if the conclusion holds in this selected world.
Similarly, in the counterfactual interpretation of causality,
instead of considering only one world, we consider all possible
worlds. We then say that e casually influences e′ if in every
world in which e occurs, this occurrence affects e′ . For
example, we want to check whether a rain dance (e) causes
rain (e′ ). In our world, we observe a rain dance, and we
observe rain, but we cannot tell whether the rain was caused
by the rain dance or not. Intuitively, the way to check is to
see if rain dances leads to rain. So, in one possible world, we
perform a rain dance, in another possible world, we do not
perform it. If, as a result, we see rain in the first world but not
in the second one, this is good indication that the rain dance
indeed causes rain.
World 1
World 2
rain ∗6
e′

rain dance ∗ e

e′ ∗6
no rain

e ∗ no rain dance

Can we make this idea practical? In reality, we only observe
one Universe, in which we either perform the action or we do
not.
At first glance, it may seem that in this case, there is no
meaningful way to provide an operational definition of spacetime causality.
Our idea. In this paper, we show that a meaningful operational definition of space-time causality is possible if we
use the notions of algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov
complexity. Before we explain our idea, let us briefly recall
the corresponding notions.

III. A LGORITHMIC R ANDOMNESS AND KOLMOGOROV
C OMPLEXITY: A B RIEF R EMINDER
Motivation for algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov
complexity. Intuitively, we know that some sequences of 0s
and 1s (or, equivalently, heads and tails) are random, while
other sequences are not random. For example, intuitively, if
we flip a fair coin 4 times, we can get a sequence 0000 of
all heads. However, if we flip a coin 1000 times and still get
get all heads, common sense tells us that this coin is not fair.
Similarly, common sense tells us that, if we repeatedly flip a
fair coin, we cannot expect a periodic sequence 0101 . . . 01
(repeated 500 times).
In the traditional probability theory, it is not possible to
formally describe this intuitive difference between random and
non-random sequences. To provide such a formalization, in the
1960s, A. N. Kolmogorov, one of the world leading specialists
in probability theory and mathematical statistics, proposed the
following idea (for details, see, e.g., [2]).
Main idea behind algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov complexity. According to Kolmogorov, the intuitive
reason why a sequence consisting of all 0s is not random is
that it has a simple structure; in other words, this sequence can
be generated by a very simple for-loop program. Similarly, a
sequence consisting of a sequence 01 repeated 500 times is
simple to generate: just make a for-loop. In contrast, a truly
random sequence should not have a simple structure – that
would enables us to generate it by using some short program:
in effect, the shortest way to print this truly random sequence
is to actually print it bit-by-bit: printf(01. . . ).
This idea leads to the following way of detecting whether
a given finite sequence x of 0s and 1s is random or not:
• if this sequence x can be generated by a short program
– i.e., a program whose length is much smaller than the
length len(x) of this sequence – then x is clearly not
random;
• vice versa, if the only way to generate a sequence x is to
use a program whose length is at least len(x), then this
sequence x is truly random.
To make this distinction, we need to know, for each sequence
x, the shortest length of a program that generates x. This
shortest length is known as the Kolmogorov complexity of
the string x and denoted by K(x). In terms of Kolmogorov
complexity:
• if K(x) ≪ len(x), then x is not random;
• if K(x) ≈ len(x), then x is random.
For example, we can select a small integer C > 0 (e.g., C =
10), and define a sequence x to be random if
K(x) ≥ len(x) − C.
Definition 1. Let a programming language be fixed. By a
Kolmogorov complexity K(x) of a finite binary string x, we
mean the shortest length of a program that generates x:
def

K(x) = min{len(p) : p generates x}.

Definition 2. Let an integer C > 0 be fixed. We say that a
string x is random if K(x) ≥ len(x) − C.
Historical comment. Simultaneously with Kolmogorov, similar
ideas were proposed by R. Solomonoff and G. Chaitin [2].
Comment. The length of a program depends on the programming language. However, as Kolmogorov has shown,
the definitions K1 (x) and K2 (x) of Kolmogorov complexity based on two different languages differ by a constant:
|K1 (x) − K2 (x)| ≤ C12 for all x. Thus, in effect, different
programming languages lead to the same definition of a
random sequence.
The corresponding notion of independence. In probability
theory, in addition to analyzing what is random and what is
not, it is also important to decide when the two events are
independent and when they are not. Once we have two finite
binary sequences x and y, the idea that y is independent on
x can be described in a similar way:
• if y is independent on x, then knowing x does not help
us generate y;
• in contrast, if y depends on x, then knowing x can help
us compute y.
For example, if we know the locations and velocities x of a
mechanical system at some moment of time t, we can use this
information to easily compute the locations and velocities y
at the next moment of time t + ∆t. In contrast, an irrelevant
information x (e.g., locations and velocities of particles on
another planet) does not help in computing y.
To formalize this intuition, we should consider programs
that use x as an input to generate y.
Definition 3. Let a programming language be fixed. By a
relative Kolmogorov complexity K(y | x) of a finite binary
string y in relation to a binary string x, we mean the
shortest length of a program that, when using x as an input,
generates y:
def

K(y | x) = min{len(p) : p(x) generates y}.

Comment. Intuitively, if using x helps to compute y, i.e., if
K(y | x) ≪ K(y), this means that y depends on x. Vice versa,
if using x does not help to compute y, i.e., if K(y | x) ≈ K(y),
this means that x and y are independent. We can describe this
in a way similar to the above definition of randomness:
Definition 4. Let an integer C > 0 be fixed.
• We say that a string y is independent of the string x if
K(y | x) ≥ K(y) − C.
•

We say that a string y is dependent on the string x if
K(y | x) < K(y) − C.

IV. H OW TO D EFINE S PACE -T IME C AUSALITY: A NALYSIS
OF THE P ROBLEM AND THE R ESULTING D EFINITION
First seeming reasonable idea. At first glance, the above
notion of dependence can already lead to a natural definition
of space-time causality:
• First, we perform some measurements and observations
in the vicinity of the event e. Since most nowadays measuring instruments are computer-connected, each such
measurement produces a computer-readable output. In
the computer, everything is represented as a sequence of
0s and 1s, so the results of all the measurements and
observations will also be represented as a sequence x of
0s and 1s.
• We also perform measurements and observations in the
vicinity of the event e′ , and also produce a sequence x′
of 0s and 1s.
′
′
′
• If x depends on x, i.e., if K(x | x) ≪ K(x ), then we
′
claim that e can casually influence e .
Unfortunately, this idea does not always work. Yes, if e
can casually influence e′ , then we indeed expect that knowing
what happened at e can help us predict what is happening
at e′ . However, the inverse is not necessarily true: we may
have identical observations x = x′ at events e and e′ simply
because they are both caused by the same event e′′ from the
joint past of events e and e′ .
For example, if two people at different locations are watching the same movie, then their observations are identical, but
not because they causally influence each other, but because
they are both influenced by a past event e′′ (of making this
movie).
How to transform the above idea into a working definition.
According to modern physics, the Universe is quantum in
nature. For many measurements involving microscopic objects,
we cannot predict the exact measurement results, we can
only predict probabilities of different outcomes. The actual
observations are truly random.
Moreover, for each space-time event e, we can always set
up such random-producing experiments in the small vicinity
of e, and generate a random sequence re . For example, we
can locally set up a Stern-Gerlach experiment (see, e.g., [1]),
a quantum experiment that generates a truly random sequence.
This random sequence can affect future results, so if we
know this random sequence, it may help us predict future
observations. So, if e can causally influence e′ , then for some
observations x′ performed in the small vicinity of e′ , we have
K(x′ | re ) ≪ K(x′ ).
However, it is clear that this sequence cannot affect the
measurement results which are in the past (or, more generally,
not in the future) of the event e. So, if e cannot causally
influence e′ , then observations x′ made in the vicinity of e′
are independent on re : K(x′ | re ) ≈ K(x′ ). So, we arrive at
the following semi-formal definition:
Definition 5. For each space-time event e, let re denote a random sequence that is generated by an experiment performed

in the small vicinity of e. We say that the event e can causally
influence the event e′ if for some observations x′ performed
in the small vicinity of e′ , we have
K(x′ | re ) ≪ K(x′ ).

Historical comment. Our definition follows the ideas of casuality as mark transmission [6], [7], with the random sequence
as a mark.
Discussion. We have argued that if e does not causally
influence e′ , then, no matter what we measure in the vicinity of
the event e′ , we get K(x′ | re ) ≈ K(x′ ); so, in these cases, the
above definition is in accordance with the physical intuition.
On the other hand, if e can causally influence e′ , this means
that we can send a signal from e to e′ , and as this signal, we
send all the bits forming the random sequence re . The signal
x′ received in the vicinity of e′ will thus be identical to re , so
generating x′ based on re does not require any computations
at all: K(x′ | re ) = 0. Since the sequence x′ = re is random,
we have
K(x′ ) ≥ len(x′ ) − C.
For a sufficiently long random sequence re = x′ , namely for
a sequence for which len(x′ ) > 2C, we have
K(x′ ) ≥ len(x′ ) − C > 2C − C = C,
so
and thus,

0 = K(x′ | re ) < K(x′ ) − C
K(x′ | re ) ≪ K(x′ ).

So, in these cases, the above definition is also in accordance
with the physical intuition.
V. A S OMEWHAT U NEXPECTED C OROLLARY OF O UR
D EFINITION : S PACE -T IME C AUSALITY IS A M ATTER OF
D EGREE
Randomness is a matter of degree. According to the above
definition, a sequence x is random if K(x) ≥ len(x) − C for
some small integer C. Smallness is not an absolute property,
it is a matter of degree.
For a given sequence x, its degree of randomness d(x) can
be described by the smallest integer C for which K(x) ≥
len(x)−C. One can check that this smallest integer is equal to
the difference d(x) = len(x) − K(x). For random sequences,
d(x) is small, for sequences which are not random, this degree
is large. The smaller the difference d(x), the more random is
the sequence x.
So:
• if for some sequence x, we have K(x) ≤ len(x) − C for
a small integer C, while
′
• for another sequence x of the same length, we only have
′
the inequality K(x ) ≥ len(x′ ) − C ′ for a larger integer
C ′ > C,

then it is reasonable to conclude that the sequence x is “more
random” than the sequence x′ .
For example, if we start with a sequence x obtained by a
truly random physical process (e.g., flipping a coin, or, better
yet, a truly random quantum experiment) and start replacing
the first few bits with 0s, then we get new sequences which
are, intuitively, less and less random – until we replace so
many bits by 0s that the sequence stops being random.
Observation: space-time causality is a matter of degree.
Our definition of causality uses the notion of randomness:
namely, we say that there is a causal relation between e and
e′ if for some random sequence re generated in the vicinity
of the event e and for measurement results x′ produced in the
vicinity of e′ , we have K(x′ | re ) < K(x′ ) − C for some large
integer C.
The larger the integer C, the more confident we are that an
event e can causally influence e′ . It is therefore reasonable, for
each pair of events e and e′ , to define a degree of causality c as
the largest integer C for which K(x′ | re ) < K(x′ ) − C. One
can check that this largest integer is equal to the difference
c = K(x′ ) − K(x′ | re ) − 1. The largest this difference c,
the more confident we are that e can influence e′ . Thus, this
difference can serve as degree with which e can influence e′ .
In other words, just like randomness turns out to be a matter
of degree, causality is also a matter of degree.
Comment. While this conclusion may be unexpected from the
viewpoint of traditional physics, it is in good accordance with
the general idea of fuzzy logic, that everything – including
causality – is a matter of degree; see, e.g., [8].
Corresponding open problems. It is desirable to explore
possible physical meaning of such “degrees of causality”:
instead of describing the space-time causality, we now have a
function d(e, e′ ) that, for each pair of
events for which e
causally precedes e′ , describes to what extent e can influence
e′ . Maybe this function d(e, e′ ) is related to relativistic metric
– the amount of proper time between e and e′ ?
Another open problem is related to the fact that he above
definition works for localized objects, objects which are located in a small vicinity of one spatial location.
In quantum physics, not all objects are localize in spacetime. We can have situations when the states of two spatially
separated particles are entangled. It is desirable to extend our
definition to such objects as well.
VI. C ONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new operationalist definition
of causality between space-time events. Namely, to check
whether an event e can casually influence an event e′ , we:
• generate a truly random sequence re in the small vicinity
of the event e, and
′
• perform observations in the small vicinity of the event e .
′
′
If some observation results x (obtained near e ) depend on
the sequence re (in the precise sense of dependence described
in the paper), then we claim that e can casually influence e′ .

On the other hand, if all observation results x′ are independent
on re , then we claim that e cannot casually influence e′ .
This new definition naturally leads to a conclusion that
space-time causality is a matter of degree, a conclusion that
is worth physical analysis.
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